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I. INTRODUCTION 
In spite of ratifying the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in 1992, and thus formally 
recognizing the threat of climate change, the United States is 
yet to enact policy commensurate with the scale of the global 
crisis.  The Obama Administration failed in an early attempt at 
passing comprehensive federal legislation with the American 
Clean Energy and Security Act (also known as the “Waxman-
Markey Bill”).1  The administration later moved on to exercising 
the federal government’s existing regulatory authority to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs)2 through what was dubbed 
 
1 The Waxman-Markey Bill included the following provisions:  “(1) . . . requiring retail 
electricity suppliers to meet 20% of their demand through renewable electricity and 
electricity savings by 2020; (2) . . . improving overall U.S. energy productivity by at least 
2.5% per year by 2012 and maintaining that improvement rate through 2030; and (3) 
establishing a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and setting 
goals for reducing such emissions from covered sources by 83% of 2005 levels by 2050.”  
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (as passed by 
House, Jun. 26, 2009). 
2 As discussed in more detail in Section I(A) of this Note, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) significantly expanded executive authority 
to reduce GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act.  For an overview of executive 
authority to regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act and other statutes, see 
Jonathan H. Adler, Heat Expands All Things: The Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas 
Regulation Under the Obama Administration, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421, 423–44 
(2011).  
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the “President’s Climate Action Plan.”3  This plan included a 
patchwork of policies that covered various sectors of the economy 
with a focus on the electricity sector through the “Clean Power 
Plan.”  At its best, the Clean Power Plan’s impact on GHGs in 
the electricity sector would be a modest 32% below 2005 levels 
by 2030.4  The Trump Administration has moved to repeal the 
Clean Power Plan and has proposed rolling back numerous 
Obama-era climate regulations.5  Federal climate policy thus 
continues to fall short of both the near and long-term GHG 
reduction pledges made by the United States towards the Paris 
Agreement in 2015.6 
A new administration may have another hand at federal 
climate change legislation.  While a federal carbon tax has often 
been touted as the most effective solution to reducing GHG 
 
3 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (2013), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/president 
27sclimateactionplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/P76X-P229]. 
4  See The Clean Power Plan, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Dec. 19, 2019), 
https://www.ucsusa.org/our-work/global-warming/reduce-emissions/what-is-the-clean-
power-plan [https://perma.cc/FS3D-JZPF]. 
5 Nathan Rott, Trump Moves To Let States Regulate Coal Plant Emissions, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Aug. 21, 2018, 10:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/21/639396683/trump-
moves-to-let-states-regulate-coal-plant-emissions [https://perma.cc/AY27-FPP4].  For a 
comprehensive list of deregulatory efforts taken by the Trump Administration on climate 
change, see generally, Climate Deregulation Tracker, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
L., http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker/ (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2020). 
6 The Paris Agreement recognizes “the need for an effective and progressive response to 
the urgent threat of climate change.”  U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Adoption of the Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015).  
Since its adoption in 2015, 189 Parties have ratified the agreement.  As part of the United 
States’ first contribution towards the Paris Agreement, the Obama Administration 
committed to reduce GHG emissions by 26–28% by 2025, noting that this would put it 
on a “straight line emission reduction pathway from 2020 to deep, economy-wide 
emission reductions of 80% or more by 2050.” UNITED STATES, NDC SUBMISSION (2015), 
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/ 
United%20States%20of%20America%20First/U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submission.
pdf [https://perma.cc/38GM-X27F].  The Trump Administration has announced the 
withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement, but under the terms of the 
agreement, the withdrawal will not take effect until November 4, 2020, the day after the 
next U.S. presidential election.  See Umair Irfan, The United States Has Filed the Official 
Paperwork to Withdraw from the Paris Agreement, VOX (Nov. 4, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/11/4/20948612/paris-climate-
agreement-withdrawal-trump-exit [https://perma.cc/XRJ4-BCRT]. 
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emissions,7 advocates and some scholars of late have come to 
accept the political limitations of such a policy, instead 
championing a National Clean Energy Standard (“NCES”) as an 
alternative. 8  While state-level clean energy mandates (often 
dubbed “Renewable Portfolio Standards”) are on strong legal 
footing, as evidenced by their presence in twenty-nine states and 
Washington, D.C.,9 an NCES would have to co-exist with state 
mandates and avoid encroaching on the federal-state firewall 
over energy policy under the existing Federal Power Act. 10  
Furthermore, an NCES may need to be more expansive than 
simply mandating zero-carbon resources, as recent reports have 
shown that significant levels of Negative Emissions 
Technologies (“NETs”) would need to be deployed at a global 
level in order to keep global temperature rise to below 1.5°C or 
2°C—the two temperature targets enshrined in the Paris 
Agreement.11 
 
7  See, e.g., Jennifer A. Dloughy, Yellen Touts Carbon Tax as ‘Textbook Solution’ to 
Climate Change, BLOOMBERG (Sep. 10, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2018-09-10/yellen-touts-carbon-tax-as-textbook-solution-to-climate-change 
[https://perma.cc/K2K4-GMC3]; David L. Chandler, Carbon Taxes Could Make 
Significant Dent in Climate Change, Study Finds, MIT NEWS (Apr. 6, 2018), 
http://news.mit.edu/2018/carbon-taxes-could-make-significant-dent-climate-change-
0406 [https://perma.cc/9BHC-P555]. 
8  See, e.g., Justin Gillis & Jameson McBride, Here's How to Cut Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Without Taxing Them, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2018/08/14/opinion/how-to-cut-greenhouse-gas-emissions-without-taxing-
them.html [https://perma.cc/8S4P-9NU9] (arguing that putting a price on greenhouse 
gas emissions would be a “political fantasy”).  The authors note “a different approach 
might stand a better chance in Congress—one that would focus on building more clean 
energy, rather than taxing emissions.  This could be accomplished by setting a national 
clean-energy standard.” Id.  See also Joseph E. Aldy et al., Willingness to Pay and 
Political Support for a US National Clean Energy Standard, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 
596, 596 (2012) (finding that “an ‘80% by 2035’ NCES could pass both chambers of 
Congress if it increases electricity rates less than 5% on average.”). 
9 See State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards 
.aspx [https://perma.cc/WF6J-E22P] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
10  See Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market:  The Impact of a 
National Renewable Portfolio Standard on the U.S. Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L.J. 49, 
64 (2008) (arguing that a national RPS would have to co-exist with state RPS programs); 
Giovanni S. Saarman González, Evolving Jurisdiction Under the Federal Power Act: 
Promoting Clean Energy Policy, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1422 (2016) (describing the 
jurisdictional tensions between federal and state clean energy policy). 
11 See Umair Irfan, A Major New Climate Report Slams the Door on Wishful Thinking,  
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This Note will propose the most legally robust National Clean 
Energy Standard that can incorporate NETs.  Part II provides 
background on existing federal and state efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions and the need for an NCES with NETs.  Part III will 
identify the legal barriers to an NCES and the inclusion of 
NETs, drawing on the history of federal and state climate policy.  
Finally, in Part IV, this Note will propose an NCES with a 
trading mechanism among states that would allow for NETs to 
compete on par with clean energy resources to reduce the carbon 
intensity of the electricity sector and promote the commercial 
viability of NETs. 
II. THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING FEDERAL AND STATE 
CLIMATE POLICIES AND THE NEED FOR  
AN NCES WITH NETS 
Despite the Trump Administration’s unwillingness to engage 
with global efforts to tackle climate change, U.S. GHG emissions 
have continued to decline in recent years.12  This decline has 
 
VOX (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/5/17934174/climate-change-global-
warming-un-ipcc-report-1-5-degrees [https://perma.cc/NKU3-ZDZH] (citing a recent 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report that states any pathway to limiting 
global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius will require “upward of 1,000 gigatons of carbon 
dioxide removed from the atmosphere by the end of the century.”); Roz Pidcock, Two 
Degree Climate Target Not Possible Without ‘Negative Emissions,’ Scientists Warn, 
CARBON BRIEF (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.carbonbrief.org/two-degree-climate-target-
not-possible-without-negative-emissions-scientists-warn [https://perma.cc/TV87-NVG4] 
(citing study that states “staying below 2C requires capturing and storing carbon in 
amounts that exceed the capabilities of current technology . . .”). 
12 The EPA’s most recent U.S. GHG emissions inventory shows a decline in emissions 
starting in 2014.  See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-R-18-003, INVENTORY OF U.S. 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS:  1990–2016 at 2-1 (2018), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-
01/documents/2018_complete_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ7T-UBBA].  The EPA has 
since announced “overall decreases across sectors and that total U.S. greenhouse gas 
emissions reported decreased by 2.7 percent from 2016 to 2017.”  Data Shows Decrease 
in U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions During Trump’s First Year in Office, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY (Oct. 17, 2018), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/newsreleases/data-shows-
decrease-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-during-trumps-first-year-office.html 
[https://perma.cc/BEH7-P8XE].  Contrary to what the EPA claims, however, 
independent estimates have found a slowing decline in GHG emissions under the Trump 
Administration.  See Louis Jacobson, Are Greenhouse Emissions Down Under Donald 
Trump, as EPA Says?, POLITIFACT (June 18, 2018), https://www.politifact 
.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2018/jun/18/environmental-protection-agency/are-
greenhouse-emissions-down-under-donald-trump-e/ [https://perma.cc/HDZ9-CMVR]. 
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largely been due to market trends as opposed to concerted 
federal policy.13   Moreover, major GHG reductions driven by 
federal policy have been incidental rather than intentional.  For 
example, the Montreal Protocol, a treaty ratified by the U.S. 
Senate in 1988, was designed to reduce ozone-depleting 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).14  To date, implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol has been one of the most effective federal 
actions to reduce GHG emissions.15  While some states have 
tried to independently make up for the deficit in federal policy, 
these efforts have been uneven at best, and, in some cases, have 
been hampered by federal courts.16  This Part provides a broad 
overview of current federal and state climate policy and in that 
context, describes the need for an NCES that includes NETs.  
Part II(A) lays out the overarching reasons for why climate 
action at the federal level is urgently needed and particularly 
why an NCES incorporating NETs needs to be established and 
streamlined with existing state clean energy mandates.  Part 
II(B) provides background on what an NCES and NETs entail, 
and explains how an NCES can promote the development of 
NETs. 
 
13 Estimates show that “[b]etween 2005 and 2016, almost 80% of the reduction in energy-
related CO2 emissions in the US came from the electric power sector.”  See Trevor Houser 
& Peter Marsters, Final US Emissions Numbers for 2017, RHODIUM GRP. (Mar. 29, 
2018), https://rhg.com/research/final-us-emissions-numbers-for-2017 
[https://perma.cc/5WKL-P72C].  The decline in GHGs in the power sector, however, is 
“being driven by a number of factors, including steadily falling renewable prices, 
sustained low natural gas prices, consumer preference, and Congress’ extension of tax 
credits for renewable energy resources.”  See Nicholas Bianco & Martha Roberts, Experts 
Agree: The U.S. Power Sector is Rapidly Decarbonizing as a Result of Market Trends, 
ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Jan. 5, 2017), http://blogs.edf.org/climate411/files/2017/ 
01/CPP-Combined-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/MH54-XPZ5]. 
14 CFCs, in addition to contributing to ozone depletion, are also potent GHGs.  The 
alternative to CFCs—hydrochlorofluorocarbons (“HCFCs”) and hydrofluorocarbons 
(“HFCs”)—are also potent GHGs, which are being phased out through two subsequent 
amendments to the Montreal Protocol agreed to in 1992 and 2016 (known as the “The 
Kigali Amendment”). 
15 See Lei Hu et al., Considerable Contribution of the Montreal Protocol to Declining 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from the United States, 44 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 8075, 
8075–76, 8082 (2017) (finding that “the overall influence of the Montreal Protocol on U.S. 
GHG emissions decline from 2005 to 2025 . . . is equivalent to ~25–30% of the GHG 
emission reduction target previously identified in the U.S. Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDCs) to the [Paris Agreement] . . .”). 
16 See infra section II(A)(2). 
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A. U.S. Climate Policy: An Inadequate and Uneven Patchwork 
1. Federal Climate Policy: Too Little Too Late? 
Comprehensive federal climate change policy has been elusive.  
Early legislative efforts failed during the George W. Bush 
Administration.17   Nevertheless, successful energy legislation 
from this time had discernible impacts on GHG emissions 
through the promotion of less carbon-intensive fuels, fuel 
economy, and energy efficiency. 18   In the wake of the Great 
Recession, the stimulus bill 19 —one of the first signature 
legislative accomplishments under the Obama Administration—
provided over $90 billion in clean energy investment and tax 
incentives.20  The Waxman-Markey climate bill, which would 
have established a renewable energy standard and a cap-and-
trade program, stalled in the U.S. Senate after passage in the 
 
17 In 2003, then-Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Joe Lieberman (I-CT) proposed a 
bipartisan bill to establish a cap-and-trade system regulating the electricity, industrial, 
commercial, and transportation sectors.  See Climate Stewardship and Act of 2003, S. 
139, 108th Cong. (2003).  They later proposed another bill in 2005 to establish a cap-and-
trade system removing the transportation sector and including provisions promoting 
energy innovation.  See Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, S. 1151, 109th 
Cong. (2005).  Both bills were defeated on the Senate floor. 
18 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 brought major reforms to the regulatory framework 
governing energy but also notably promoted natural gas production.  See Energy Policy 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). The Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007 then followed, promoting fuel economy and energy efficiency in 
buildings.  See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-140, 121 Stat. 
1492 (2007). 
19 American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 
(2009). 
20 See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The Recovery Act Made the Largest 
Single Investment in Clean Energy in History, Driving the Deployment of Clean Energy, 
Promoting Energy Efficiency, and Supporting Manufacturing (Feb. 25, 2016) (on file with 
Obama White House Archives), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/02/25/fact-sheet-recovery-act-made-largest-single-investment-clean-energy 
[https://perma.cc/2YA2-95AQ].  
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House of Representatives. 21   Later attempts at climate 
legislation during the Obama Administration also failed.22  
In the absence of federal climate change legislation, a coalition 
of states and cities filed a lawsuit in 2005 claiming that the 
Clean Air Act (“CAA”) required the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) to regulate GHG emissions, and 
specifically establish emissions standards for motor vehicles.23  
The Supreme Court subsequently held in Massachusetts v. EPA 
that GHGs fit the definition of an “air pollutant” under the CAA 
and that the burden was on the EPA to justify its inaction.24 The 
EPA later under the Obama Administration formally found 
GHGs to be “air pollutant[s]” under CAA section 202(b) (also 
known as the “endangerment finding”),25 triggering regulation 
of GHG emissions from motor vehicles. 26   Using the 
endangerment finding, the Obama Administration employed a 
 
21 The Waxman-Markey bill, introduced by Congressmen Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Ed 
Markey (D-MA) passed the House of Representatives but was never introduced for a vote 
on the Senate floor.  See Bryan Walsh, Why the Climate Bill Died, TIME (July 26, 2010), 
http://science.time.com/2010/07/26/why-the-climate-bill-died/ [https://perma.cc/ 
WDN6-SYYE].  For a summary of what was included in the Waxman-Markey bill see 
supra note 1. 
22  On the heels of the passage of the Waxman-Markey bill in the House of 
Representatives, Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and Barbara Boxer (D-CA) introduced a 
companion bill in the Senate, which failed to gain traction.  A final bipartisan attempt 
by Senators Kerry, Lieberman, and Graham (R-SC)—known as the “Three Amigos”—in 
2010 was also shelved.  For a fascinating account of the Senate efforts to pass 
comprehensive climate legislation, see Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER 
(Oct. 11, 2010), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/11/as-the-world-burns 
[https://perma.cc/66KW-SEY5]. 
23 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
24 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497, 500 (2007) (“Because greenhouse gases fit well within 
the Clean Air Act’s capacious definition of ‘air pollutant,’ we hold that EPA has the 
statutory authority to regulate the emission of such gases from new motor 
vehicles . . . Under the Act's clear terms, EPA can avoid promulgating regulations only 
if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides 
some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to 
determine whether they do.”). 
25  Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. ch. 1). 
26 The Obama Administration raised fuel economy standards to 54.5 miles per gallon for 
cars and light-duty trucks by 2025.  See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, 
Obama Administration Finalizes Historic 54.5 MPG Fuel Efficiency Standards (Aug. 28, 
2012) (on file with Obama White House Archives), https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/28/obama-administration-finalizes-historic-545-
mpg-fuel-efficiency-standard [https://perma.cc/WUU3-VN28]. 
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patchwork of other GHG regulations covering energy efficiency, 
hydrofluorocarbon and methane emissions, and, notably, 
electricity sector emissions through the now-repealed Clean 
Power Plan. 27   Even under the best of circumstances, this 
smattering of federal regulations forged through existing CAA 
authority falls short of the economy-wide effort needed for the 
United States to reduce its GHG emissions in line with either of 
the temperature targets enshrined in the Paris Agreement.28 
Separate from regulations, the federal government has 
provided targeted subsidies to select renewable energy 
resources.  The Production Tax Credit (“PTC”) provides 
subsidies for the first ten years of production for onshore wind, 
geothermal, energy produced from landfill gas, and hydroelectric 
power.29  The Investment Tax Credit (“ITC”) provides a subsidy 
for the initial investment for offshore wind, solar, small wind 
turbines, and biomass. 30   Studies have shown that while 
“renewable electricity tax credits do increase renewable power 
generation . . . the effect is small relative to the entire 
generating fleet.  The impact of the ITC and the PTC is also 
reduced by the existence of renewable power mandates in more 
than half the states.”31  While the federal and state governments 
appear to be working towards the same objective, federal efforts 
could have a bigger impact if they are harmonized with state 
efforts. 
 
27 The Clean Power Plan established a flexible target to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
from power plants by 32% below 2005 levels by 2030.  See Press Release, Office of the 
Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: President Obama to Announce Historic Carbon Pollution 
Standards for Power Plants (Aug. 3, 2015) (on file with Obama White House Archives), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/ 
08/03/fact-sheet-president-obama-announce-historic-carbon-pollution-standards 
[https://perma.cc/HZ4K-S6NZ].  A summary of other major GHG reduction efforts by the 
Obama Administration can be found in the President’s Climate Action Plan, supra note 
3.  
28 See USA: Country Summary, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, https://climateactiontracker. 
org/countries/usa/ [https://perma.cc/XEU7-Z4Q3] (last updated Nov. 29, 2018) (“Even 
meeting the US target under the Paris Agreement would, however, be ‘Insufficient’ to 
limit warming to 2°C, let alone 1.5˚C.”). 
29 See Brian C. Murray et al., How Effective are US Renewable Energy Subsidies in 
Cutting Greenhouse Gases?, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 569, 570 tbl.1 (2014). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 573. 
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2. State Clean Energy Policy:  Laboratories or Impediments 
to Federal Climate Policy? 
States have pursued their own climate mitigation strategies, 
with twenty-nine states and Washington D.C. having some form 
of a clean energy mandate for electricity generation. 32  
Additionally, recognizing the importance of preserving and 
promoting nuclear power for climate mitigation purposes, some 
states have created either standalone programs to support 
nuclear power or expanded their clean energy mandates to 
include nuclear power.  Illinois and New York State, for 
example, have established Zero Emissions Credits (“ZECs”) 
programs designed exclusively to provide credits to nuclear 
generators. 33   Modeled after Renewable Energy Credits 
(“RECs”),34  these ZECs programs pay nuclear generators per 
megawatt-hour of energy produced.35 
Clean energy mandates are considered a legally robust policy 
option for states insofar as they exclusively affect in-state 
electricity generation.  There are, however, increasing concerns 
that state climate policies supporting clean energy resources 
may artificially distort interstate electricity markets, violating 
the dormant Commerce Clause.  The fault line in many of these 
legal battles is the “extraterritoriality principle,” which finds a 
state law invalid if “it has the ‘practical effect’ of regulating 
commerce outside the state’s borders, or effectively ‘controls the 
conduct of those engaged in commerce occurring wholly outside 
 
32 See State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, supra note 9. 
33  See DANIEL SHEA & KRISTY HARTMAN, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, STATE 
OPTIONS TO KEEP NUCLEAR IN THE ENERGY MIX 25–26 (2017) https://www.ncsl.org/ 
Portals/1/Documents/energy/StateOptions_NuclearPower_f02_WEB.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QLZ4-7KW4]. 
34 RECs vary from state to state depending on how their RPS programs are structured.  
See JOHN HAMRIN, CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALLIANCE, REC DEFINITIONS AND TRACKING 
MECHANISMS USED BY STATE RPS PROGRAMS (JUN. 2014), https://www.cesa.org/wp-
content/uploads/RECs-Attribute-Definitions-Hamrin-June-2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WC93-G3BZ]. 
35 In New York, independent research showed that “although customers would pay for 
ZECs, they would avoid a power price increase that is larger than the ZEC cost.  This 
means that customers actually pay less overall for power than if the upstate nuclear 
plants were to shut down.”  BRATTLE GRP., PRELIMINARY COMMENT ON NEW YORK 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE “STAFF’S RESPONSIVE PROPOSAL FOR PRESERVING 
ZERO-EMISSIONS ATTRIBUTES” 2 (July 2016), http://files.brattle.com/files/5799_ 
comment_on_july_8_staff_proposal_-_brattle.pdf [https://perma.cc/HA9B-FDBB]. 
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the State.’” 36   In a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to 
Colorado’s RPS, which required utilities to obtain 20% of their 
electricity from renewable energy sources, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the RPS on the grounds 
that the net price impact on out-of-state consumers was not clear 
enough to be struck down under the extraterritoriality 
principle.37 
ZECs programs have also come under legal scrutiny.  In order 
to mitigate the potential wholesale market distortions that 
would arise from state support for nuclear generation, PJM and 
NYISO—the interstate grid operators governing Illinois and 
New York respectively—considered imposing what is known as 
a “Minimum Offer Price Rule” (“MOPR”), which would establish 
a price floor only above which nuclear generators could bid into 
wholesale capacity markets.38  In two recent cases, the Courts of 
Appeals for the Seventh 39  and Second40  Circuits respectively 
“determined that state support for the environmental attributes 
of zero carbon emitting resources did not improperly interfere 
 
36 Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth Henley, Energy Policy, Extraterritoriality, and the 
Dorman Commerce Clause, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 127, 133 (2013–2014). 
37 Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1174 (10th Cir. 2015).  
38 See Marcy Crane, FERC Pressed to Address Zero-Emission Credits' Impacts on NYISO, 
PJM Markets, S&P GLOBAL:  MARKET INTELLIGENCE (Sep. 1. 2017), 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-
insights/trending/vt1ocbxoigvlxmdwoyh7fg2 [https://perma.cc/A65F-3L2L].  For more 
detailed background on how a “MOPR” would function and the effect it would have on 
nuclear resources, see Ann McCabe & Miles Farmer, How FERC Can Protect Customers 
and Respect State Energy Policy Authority in its PJM Capacity Market Proceeding, UTIL. 
DIVE (Sep. 25, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/how-ferc-can-protect-customers-
and-respect-state-energy-policy-authority-in/533095/ [https://perma.cc/E9E8-9SPF]. 
39 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518, 522–25 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The [FPA] 
divides regulatory authority between states and the FERC.  The Commission regulates 
the sale of electricity in interstate commerce . . . while states regulate local distribution 
plus the facilities used to generate power. . . . Illinois has not engaged in any 
discrimination beyond what is required by the rule that a state must regulate within its 
borders.”). 
40 Coal. for Competitive Elec., v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir. 2018) (“FERC uses 
auctions to set wholesale prices . . . with the background assumption that the FPA 
establishes a dual regulatory system between the states and federal 
government . . . [and] the states engage in public policies that affect the wholesale 
markets. Accordingly, the ZEC program does not cause clear damage to federal 
goals . . . .”). 
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with wholesale markets.” 41   The Supreme Court punted on 
hearing either of these cases, leaving the circuit court decisions 
to stand. 42   Meanwhile, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”) has exercised its own authority to 
undercut the Illinois ZEC program ordering PJM to 
“dramatically expand its [MOPR] to nearly all state-subsidized 
capacity resources” to preserve the “integrity and effectiveness 
of PJM’s capacity market.” 43   Under FERC’s order, energy 
resources supported by the ZEC and RPS programs within 
PJM’s jurisdiction would be subject to price floors when bidding 
into wholesale capacity markets.44  These recent legal challenges 
have highlighted the tension between state climate policies and 
federal authority to regulate interstate electricity markets 
under the Federal Power Act.  These federalism issues are 
discussed more extensively in Part III(A)(1). 
State clean energy mandates have nevertheless gone forward, 
engendering a “race to the top.” 45   The National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory estimates that taken in their current form 
out to 2050, state clean energy mandates provide $97 billion in 
health and environmental benefits as well as $161 billion in 
global climate benefits, while only costing $31 billion.46  There is 
 
41 Brien J. Sheahan, When PJM's Capacity Market stops Working for Consumers is it 
Time to Leave?, UTIL. DIVE (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/when-pjms-
capacity-market-stops-working-for-consumers-is-it-time-to-leave/538605/ 
[https://perma.cc/GN4S-R4VF]. 
42 See Gavin Bade, Supreme Court Won't Hear Nuke Subsidy Cases, Clarifying State 
Energy Jurisdiction, UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ 
supreme-court-wont-hear-nuke-subsidy-cases-clarifying-state-energy-jurisd/552768/ 
[https://perma.cc/T2DT-8ULU] (“The Supreme Court's decision not to hear challenges to 
the nuclear subsidies is the final ruling on the legality of the programs, whose structure 
has now been replicated in other states.”). 
43 See Sonal Patel, The Significance of FERC’s Recent PJM MOPR Order Explained, 
POWER MAG. (Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.powermag.com/the-significance-of-fercs-
recent-pjm-mopr-order-explained/ [https://perma.cc/2A63-8ELY]. 
44 See Order Establishing Just and Reasonable Rate, 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 at P 69 (Dec. 
19, 2019) (“We reiterate that if an out-of-market payment meets the definition of State 
Subsidy above—including ZEC and RPS programs—then the State-Subsidized Resource 
is subject to the default offer price floor.”). 
45 Thomas P. Lyon & Haitao Yin, Why Do States Adopt Renewable Portfolio Standards?:  
An Empirical Investigation, 31 ENERGY J. 131, 153 (2010). 
46  TRIEU MAI ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. NREL/TP-6A20-67455, A 
PROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE COSTS, BENEFITS, AND IMPACTS OF U.S. RENEWABLE 
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS vii–viii (Dec. 2016), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/ 
67455.pdf [https://perma.cc/97CL-S9EF]. 
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much untapped potential with regard to the benefits state clean 
energy mandates can provide, however.  The strict legal barriers 
restricting state clean energy policy to operate within the 
confines of in-state electricity generation have frustrated 
transmission coordination among states that would facilitate a 
more economically efficient method for renewable energy to be 
exported and imported among states. 47   This has made 
coordinated federal policy—particularly an NCES—imperative. 
B. National Clean Energy Standards and Negative Emissions 
Technologies 
A recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(“IPCC”) report describes the grave differences between a world 
that experiences 2°C versus 1.5°C of warming. 48   All global 
pathways to hold global temperature rise to 1.5°C require a 
global phase out of fossil fuels along with varying levels of carbon 
dioxide removal.49  This requires every country to take efforts to 
facilitate this global transition away from fossil fuels and deploy 
NETs to offset existing and residual GHG emissions.50  A federal 
clean energy mandate—an NCES with NETs—is woefully 
needed for the United States to make meaningful progress in 
reducing GHG emissions.  In addition to the classic free-rider 
problem caused by uneven policies among states, “nine of the top 
twenty carbon dioxide emitting states do not have enforceable 
renewable portfolio standards.”51  Moreover, “[b]ecause of the 
range of characteristics encompassed by RPSs and the unique 
 
47 Lyon & Yin, supra note 45, at 153 (“[A]n efficient renewable energy policy would likely 
involve transmission of massive amounts of renewable power from one region to another, 
a goal frustrated by in-state requirements.  Thus, it is not enough for state 
environmental policies to encourage a race to the top; they need to achieve policy 
coordination as well.”).  See also SHALINI VAJJHALA ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, 
GREEN CORRIDORS:  LINKING INTERREGIONAL TRANSMISSION EXPANSION AND 
RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES 26 (Mar. 2008), https://media.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-
08-06.pdf?_ga=2.193758821.970362960.1550222239-821454848.1549825468 
[https://perma.cc/AAE6-66QT] (“As one would expect, REC prices come down with 
transmission expansion, making the policy more affordable for consumers everywhere.”). 
48 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), GLOBAL WARMING OF 
1.5 C:  SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (Valerie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018).  
49 See Id. at 14–17. 
50 Id. 
51  Francesca F. Bochner, Water, Wind, And Fire: A Call For A Federal Renewable 
Portfolio Standard, XXV DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y. FORUM 201, 215–16 (2014). 
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aspects of each state, as many different RPS designs exist as do 
jurisdictions that have enacted these policies.” 52   An NCES 
would harmonize policies among states53  that currently have 
some form of a clean energy mandate while also ensuring that 
high-emitting states that do not currently have clean energy 
mandates are brought under federal regulation. 
1. The Potency of a National Clean Energy Standard 
Scholars have long debated the best approach to reducing 
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions.  The prevailing wisdom says 
that a price on carbon is the most economically efficient means 
to reduce GHG emissions.54  A price on carbon can come in the 
form of a direct tax on carbon or a cap-and-trade system that 
establishes a cap on GHG emissions and allows regulated 
entities to trade credits.  However, there are severe political 
constraints blocking the establishment of a national price on 
carbon—namely, collective action challenges, regulatory 
capture, and concerted industry opposition. 55   Additionally, 
voters also prefer command-and-control regulations and green 
subsidies, 56  which are thought to be “second-best” policy 
 
52 Anthony Chavez, Using Renewable Portfolio Standards to Accelerate Development of 
Negative Emissions Technologies, 43 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 23 (2018). 
53 For an in-depth look at the breadth of ways in which RPS policies can be developed 
among states, see Felix Mormann et al., A Tale of Three Markets:  Comparing the 
Renewable Energy Experiences of California, Texas, and Germany, 35 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
55 (2016). 
54  See WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE:  WEIGHING THE OPTIONS ON 
GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES 148–64 (2008); Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The 
Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 500 (2009) (“Without a carbon tax, 
individuals face a distorted set of prices . . . A tax forces individuals to consider the full 
set of consequences from emissions.”); Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, Using the 
Market to Address Climate Change: Insights from Theory & Experience, 141 DAEDALUS 
J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 45, 45 (“Externality pricing can promote cost-effective 
abatement, deliver efficient innovation incentives, avoid picking technology winners, and 
ameliorate, not exacerbate, government fiscal conditions.”). 
55 See Jesse D. Jenkins, Political Economy Constraints on Carbon Pricing Policies: What 
Are The Implications for Economic Efficiency, Environmental Efficacy, and Climate 
Policy Design?, 69 ENERGY POL’Y 467, 468–69 (2014). 
56 Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Voter Psychology and the Carbon Tax, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 13–14 
(2017) (“Despite the persistent pleadings of economists, polls consistently find that less 
than 40% of the public favors mitigating climate change via a broad-based carbon 
tax . . . Instead of a carbon tax, the public strongly supports command-and-control 
regulations and green subsidies.”). 
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instruments. 57   Among second-best policy instruments, clean 
energy mandates—particularly Renewable Portfolio Standards 
(“RPS”)—are a significant source of U.S. energy demand, 
accounting for nearly 58% of renewable energy additions since 
2000.58 
Studies have found that RPSs yield great health and climate 
benefits that offset the costs of investment.59  The RPS also turns 
out to be an “administratively efficient, cost-effective, market-
based approach to achieving renewable electricity policy 
objectives.” 60   Some have even argued that the demand-side 
mandates in lieu of supply-side incentives, such as tax subsidies, 
would free up public resources for other important clean energy 
priorities.61  In comparison to other policy interventions, “[a] 
clean energy standard would reduce the regulatory uncertainty 
that could be chilling investment in the power sector.” 62   In 
addition, it has been posited that clean energy mandates may 
not be second-best policy instruments after all, but instead may 
be precursors to a price on carbon.63 
 
57 Jenkins, supra note 55, at 46869.  
58  GALEN BARBOSE, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., U.S. RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO 
STANDARDS: OVERVIEW OF STATUS AND KEY TRENDS 23 (Nov. 5, 2015), 
https://www.cesa.org/assets/2015-Files/RPS-Summit/Galen-Barbose-11.5.15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4ZE5-UF33]. 
59 See Ryan Wiser et al., Assessing the Costs and Benefits of US Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, 12 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1 (2017), http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/ 
1748-9326/aa87bd/pdf [https://perma.cc/V8KR-SG4D]. 
60 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT GUIDE TO ACTION 5-2 (2015), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/guide_action_full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WT63-LXD5]. 
61 See Aldy, supra note 8.  See also JOSEPH E. ALDY, PROMOTING CLEAN ENERGY IN THE 
AMERICAN POWER SECTOR 11 (May 2011) 
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads_and_links/05_clean_ene
rgy_aldy_paper.pdf (“This would enable legislators to allocate future resources to energy 
programs that complement the clean energy standard (such as R&D on basic energy 
sciences), to other socially desired policies, or deficit reduction in lieu of clean energy 
deployment subsidies.”). 
62 Aldy supra note 8.  Aldy also explains that regulatory uncertainty can take two forms: 
“First, power companies face uncertainty over the general regulatory framework.  
Second, some regulatory approaches are characterized by more uncertainty than 
others . . . . For example, moving forward with power sector regulations under the Clean 
Air Act  . . . [introduces] the prospect of extended litigation.” Id. 
63 Jonas Meckling et al., Policy Sequencing Towards Decarbonization, 2 NATURE ENERGY 
918, 918 (2017) (Arguing that policies “promoting both the development and deployment 
of low-carbon technologies . . . . bolster clean-energy industries and reduce the cost of 
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While RPSs differ from state to state, the hallmark of an RPS 
is its support for traditional renewable resources such as 
“[p]hotovoltaic, solar thermal, and wind power,” with varying 
treatment of other resources such as “biogas, biomass, municipal 
solid waste, and hydropower.”64  Nuclear power is largely an 
unclaimed resource with “[l]arge amounts of reliable low-carbon 
nuclear power . . . generated in seventeen of the states with an 
RPS, yet none of them factor this generation into their grid 
mandates.”65  Nuclear power, however, accounts for around 20% 
of total electricity generation in the United States and a little 
over 50% of zero-carbon electricity.66  This is in spite of the fact 
that all nuclear generation capacity (save for a few reactors 
currently under construction) was built prior to 1990. 67   In 
addition to the climate benefits of nuclear power, there are 
additional benefits such as “reliability, fuel diversity within the 
broader generation portfolio, a relatively small geographic 
footprint, low air pollution (i.e., no sulfur or nitrogen oxides, or 
particulates), rural job retention and sizeable local tax revenue, 
and enhanced national security.”68  Moreover, nuclear power has 
the potential to support increased penetration of intermittent 
renewable resources such as solar and wind, providing further 
climate benefits.69 
 
low-carbon technologies, thus building political support for regulatory policy such as 
carbon pricing.”). 
64  Miriam Fischlein & Timothy M. Smith, Revisiting Renewable Portfolio Standard 
Effectiveness:  Policy Design and Outcome Specification Matter, 46 POL’Y SCI. 277, 285 
(2013). 
65 RYAN FITZPATRICK ET AL., THIRD WAY, CLEAN ENERGY STANDARDS: HOW MORE STATES 
CAN BECOME CLIMATE LEADERS (2018), http://thirdway.imgix.net/pdfs/clean-energy-
standards-how-more-states-can-become-climate-leaders.pdf [https://perma.cc/AKD2-
K6BG]. 
66 5 Fast Facts About Nuclear Energy, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/ 
ne/articles/5-fast-facts-about-nuclear-energy 
 [https://perma.cc/RND5-WCTJ] (last visited May 2, 2020). 
67  See Nuclear Power in the USA, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, https://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/usa-nuclear-power.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/X94X-4DPR] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020). 
68  DOUG VINE, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS (C2ES), SOLUTIONS FOR 
MAINTAINING THE EXISTING NUCLEAR FLEET 5 (2018), https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/ 
uploads/2018/05/solutions-for-maintaining-existing-nuclear-fleet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U2LP-EGNZ]. 
69 See J.D. Jenkins et al., The Benefits of Nuclear Flexibility in Power System Operations 
with Renewable Energy, 222 APPLIED ENERGY 872, 872 (2018) (“[N]uclear plants are 
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Studies have shown that disregarding the carbon content 
among non-renewable energy resources (e.g., nuclear power) in 
a clean energy mandate can make the imperative to lower GHG 
emissions more expensive.70  Additionally, even a modest RPS 
can result in a considerable cost premium to achieve the same 
GHG benefits as a mandate that credits zero and low-carbon 
energy resources. 71   Overall, among the decarbonization 
pathways studied for the United States to meet its baseline long-
term goal of reducing GHG emissions by 80% below 1990 levels 
by 2050, nuclear power consistently plays a role in the electricity 
generation mix.72  Numerous other studies have also supported 
the view that any meaningful plan to fully decarbonize the US 
electricity sector must allow for nuclear power. 73   An NCES 
 
technically capable of more flexible operation, changing their power output over time (i.e. 
ramping or load following) and . . . can help manage daily and seasonal variability in 
demand or renewable energy output or respond dynamically to hourly market 
prices . . . .”). 
70 See Allen A. Fawcett et al., Overview of EMF 24 Policy Scenarios, 35 ENERGY J. 33, 59 
(2014) (“While a RPS forces more non-biomass renewables into the generation mix 
despite of these cost disadvantages, its failure to differentiate non-renewable energy 
sources/technologies (nuclear, gas, and coal) according to their carbon content is an 
important impediment for obtaining cost-effectiveness.”); STEVE CLEMMER ET AL., UNION 
OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE NUCLEAR POWER DILEMMA:  DECLINING PROFITS, PLANT 
CLOSURES, AND THE THREAT OF RISING CARBON EMISSIONS 33 (2018), 
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/11/Nuclear-Power-Dilemma-full-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HSJ5-CXHG], (finding that “retiring uneconomic nuclear 
reactors before their operating licenses expire would result in a net increase in natural 
gas and coal generation and higher carbon emissions.”). 
71 David Young & John Bistline, The Costs and Value of Renewable Portfolio Standards 
in Meeting Decarbonization Goals, 73 ENERGY ECON. 337, 343 (2018) (“For the 25% RPS, 
we find the cost premium is 3.5, and for the existing state renewable portfolio standards, 
we find the cost premium is as high as 18.6.”). 
72 The Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project (“DDPP”) has presented four different 
scenarios through which the United States can achieve its long-term decarbonization 
goal.  All four scenarios require at least a fraction of the electricity generation mix to 
come from nuclear power ranging from 9.6% to 40.3% of total electricity generation.  
JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., SUSTAINABLE DEV. SOLUTIONS NETWORK & THE INST. FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. & INT’L RELATIONS, PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: TECHNICAL REPORT 20 (2015), http://deepdecarbonization.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/US_Deep_Decarbonization_Technical_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P4JZ-TC7P]. 
73 See, e.g., Christopher Clack et al., Evaluation of a Proposal for Reliable Low-Cost Grid 
Power with 100% Wind, Water, and Solar, 114 PROCE. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6722, 6727 
(2017) (concluding that “it is extremely difficult to achieve complete decarbonization of 
the energy system, even when using every current technology and tool available, 
including energy efficiency and wind, hydroelectric, and solar energy as well as carbon 
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therefore ought to broadly mandate the adoption of zero-carbon 
resources such as nuclear power in addition to traditional 
renewable energy resources. 
2. The Need for and Benefits of NETs 
As far as climate impacts are concerned, atmospheric removal 
and storage of GHG emissions have the same impact as reducing 
GHG emissions through fuel switching or energy efficiency 
measures.  Most climate models have consistently found that 
feasibly meeting the 2°C and 1.5°C temperature targets 
enshrined in the Paris Agreement require varying levels of 
active GHG emissions capture and sequestration.74  That is, “the 
concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide would have to stop 
increasing (and perhaps start decreasing) by the second half of 
the century for there to be a reasonable chance of limiting 
warming and the associated dangerous climate impacts.” 75  
NETs must be seen as part of a broad suite of climate mitigation 
efforts “rather than a way to decrease atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide only after anthropogenic 
emissions have been eliminated.”76  Recent economic analysis 
has shown that NETs can play a significant role alongside 
existing mitigation technologies, “with perhaps 10 [gigatons of 
CO2 per year (GtCO2/y)] of negative emissions needed 
approximately at midcentury and 20 GtCO2/y by the century’s 
end.” 77   In addition to contributing to net-removal of GHG 
emissions from the atmosphere, NETs can also provide the 
added benefit of offsetting GHG emission from sectors that 
 
capture and storage, bioenergy, and nuclear energy.”); J.D. JENKINS & SAMUEL 
THERNSTROM, ENERGY INNOVATION REFORM PROJECT, DEEP DECARBONIZATION OF THE 
ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR: INSIGHTS FROM RECENT LITERATURE 3 (Mar. 2017), 
https://www.innovationreform.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/02/EIRP-Deep-Decarb-Lit-Review-Jenkins-Thernstrom-March-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YSA4-76RV] (synthesizing recent literature, concludes that “reaching 
near-zero emissions will require virtually all unabated coal and gas-fired power plants 
to be replaced by zero-emissions sources.  This would necessitate a substantial increase 
in variable renewable energy from wind and solar, an expansion of nuclear power 
capacity (even as all existing nuclear reactors retire between now and 2050).”). 
74  NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES AND 
RELIABLE SEQUESTRATION:  A RESEARCH AGENDA 1–2 (2018). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 4. 
77 Id. at 21. 
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currently do not have a viable pathway to decarbonization, such 
as aviation.78 
Various types of NETs have been given prominence in the 
literature, including leveraging land use and management 
practices (such as afforestation and reforestation), bioenergy 
with carbon capture and sequestration, direct air capture, and 
carbon mineralization.79  This Note focuses on bioenergy with 
carbon capture and sequestration (“BECCS”) and direct air 
capture and storage (“DACS”), as they have the potential to be 
substantially scaled up and “would enable a gentler transition 
to a low-carbon economy.” 80   Land use and management 
practices are not included in this Note as they are considered 
part of classical mitigation technologies. 
DACS is distinct among NETs as its final product is 
concentrated CO2 that can then be sequestered.81  DACS is a 
necessary component of long-term climate mitigation as 
“reaching near-zero emissions will require virtually all unabated 
coal and gas-fired power plants to be replaced by zero-emissions 
sources . . . [including] significant penetration of coal or gas with 
CCS (with nearly 100% CO2 capture rates) . . . .”82  The federal 
government has shown early signs of providing support for 
DACS through the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, which 
extended tax credits to facilities that sequester more than 
100,000 metric tons of CO2 in a given year.83  BECCS involves 
 
78  Id. at 3–4 (“One option for zero net aviation emissions would be deployment of 
$100/tCO2 NETs to capture and store 2.5 kg of CO2 for each liter of aviation fuel 
consumed.  This will add ~25 cents per liter of fuel.  This is just one example of how 
NETs might be conceptually bundled with emissions sources that are difficult to 
eliminate.”). 
79 Id. at 4–5. 
80 Tracy Hester, Legal Pathways to the Broad Use of Negative Emissions Technologies 
and Direct Air Capture of Greenhouse Gases, 48 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,413, 
10,416 (2018) (citing SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SOLUTIONS NETWORK & INSTITUTE 
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, PATHWAYS TO DEEP 
DECARBONIZATION INTERIM REPORT 2 (2014), https://www.iddri.org 
/sites/default/files/import/publications/ddpp_interim_2014_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F86B-N2XZ]). 
81  For more information on how DACS works as a process, see Direct Air Capture 
(Technology Factsheet), GEOENGINEERING MONITOR, http://www.geoengineeringmonitor. 
org/2018/05/direct-air-capture/ [https://perma.cc/ERP4-4B4R] (last visited Mar. 22, 
2020). 
82 Jenkins & Thernstrom, supra note 73, at 3. 
83 See Hester, supra note 80, at 10,416. 
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the capture of CO2 from the atmosphere through the 
photosynthetic process and subsequent sequestration of the 
captured carbon for  geologic timescales.84  However, it should 
be noted that BECCS can only function as a NET if the captured 
carbon is sequestered as opposed to being burned for energy use, 
which would not result in a net reduction of atmospheric CO2.85  
The limiting factor to BECCS is the land availability and 
transportation constraints for processing.86  Overall, “NETs are 
still struggling to get out of the laboratory.  Initial feasibility 
studies have yet to verify that these techniques can reliably and 
safely work at a bench scale . . . before we can assess their 
potential for mass deployment and their economic efficiency.”87 
3. How an NCES can Stimulate NETs Development 
As NETs are still in their nascent stages, an NCES can play a 
critical role in stimulating their development, just as clean 
energy mandates across the country have stimulated growth in 
renewable energy technology.  Clean energy mandates by nature 
are “market-oriented policies that establish general targets, but 
they allow market actors—such as utilities, other electricity 
suppliers, project developers, and other private sector 
participants—to determine their methods of compliance.” 88  
Furthermore, clean energy mandates are uniquely equipped to 
promote specific technologies that are yet to be independently 
cost competitive.89  NETs can benefit from a carve-out in an 
NCES.  For example, specific carve-out provisions for solar in 
state RPSs have been found to promote solar development.90  
 
84  James S. Rhodes & David W. Keith, Biomass with Capture:  Negative Emissions 
Within Social and Environmental Constraints:  An Editorial Comment, 87 CLIMATIC 
CHANGE 321, 321 (2007).  
85  NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED, CLIMATE INTERVENTION: CARBON DIOXIDE 
REMOVAL AND RELIABLE SEQUESTRATION 66 (2015). 
86 See id. at 63–64 (2015) (“Both the availability of land for biomass cultivation and the 
need to transport bulky biomass to processing facilities severely limit the feasible use of 
bioenergy.”). 
87 Hester, supra note 80, at 10,421. 
88 See Chavez, supra note 52, at 28. 
89 See id. at 29–30.  
90  See Andrea Sarzynski et al., The Impact of State Financial Incentives on Market 
Deployment of Solar Technology, 46 ENERGY POL’Y 550, 556 (2012) (“We found that states 
with RPS policies installed an average of 95% more PV capacity than states without RPS 
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Wind technology, in contrast, was more established and 
commercially viable prior to the RPS effect.91  RPSs, however, 
have had a discernible impact on spurring wind deployment.92  
Overall, the data supports the proposition that “RPSs help drive 
technologies to maturity, at which point their deployment 
becomes widespread.”93 
NETs are not constrained by the traditional economic 
difficulties faced by fossil fuel energy sources coupled with 
carbon capture and storage (“CCS”).  “By contrast, negative 
emissions technologies and direct air capture need not satisfy a 
similar cost metric (although they still face the more 
fundamental challenge of how they can be paid for without 
government funding, a price on carbon, or a regulatory 
mandate).”94  An NCES would provide a regulatory mandate as 
well as an established accounting system that would allow the 
climate mitigation benefits provided by NETs to be properly 
quantified and priced.  NETs can be given a specific carve-out in 
an NCES in the short term to provide investors with certainty.95  
In the long term, as NETs become more cost-competitive they 
can directly compete with clean energy resources for their 
climate mitigation benefits.  Furthermore, similar to how RPS 
programs overcome the geographic constraints of renewable 
energy technologies through the use of Renewable Energy 
Credits (RECs), NETs can also benefit from the same regulatory 
framework due to their own potential geographic constraints.96 
 
policies, while states with specific solar set-asides installed over 722% more PV capacity, 
on average, than states without solar carve-outs.”). 
91 See Chavez, supra note 52, at 39. 
92 Id. at 40 (“79% of wind power additions either were in RPS states but exceeded RPS 
mandates or were installed in non-RPS states.”). 
93  Id. at 41 (“Just as wind was used primarily to meet RPS requirements and 
subsequently came to be installed as additional capacity in RPS states or as new capacity 
in non-RPS states, solar is beginning to follow a similar trajectory.”). 
94 See generally Michael Gerrard & Tracy Hester, Going Negative:  The Next Horizon in 
Climate Engineering Law, 32 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T  4 (2018). 
95 See Chavez, supra note 52, at 45–46. 
96 Id. (“Some NETs technologies are geographically constrained as to where they can be 
effectively implemented.  BECCS is an example of a technology that is regionally 
dependent.”). 
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III. THE POTENTIAL LEGAL BARRIERS TO AN NCES AND DESIGN 
ISSUES IN INCORPORATING NETS 
An NCES raises many of the legal questions that have 
animated not just discourse within the energy sector, but 
constitutional law at large over the years.  At its core, energy 
law is constantly contending with the constitutional “firewall” 
between federal and state jurisdiction.  The famous “Attleboro 
Gap” arose from a dispute over the Rhode Island public utility’s 
ability to raise rates on a Massachusetts-based company.97  The 
Supreme Court found that as a result of being “a direct burden 
upon interstate commerce, from which the state is restrained by 
the force of the commerce clause, it must necessarily fall, 
regardless of its purpose.”98  The Attleboro Gap was coined out of 
a recognition that “state commissions were powerless to regulate 
any interstate transactions by electric utilities” and no federal 
entity was yet in existence that could regulate interstate 
electricity transactions. 99   Congress addressed this gap by 
passing the modern Federal Power Act (FPA). 100   Broadly 
speaking, the FPA attempted to draw a line between federal and 
state jurisdiction at the wholesale and retail levels of electricity 
markets.101  As recent cases have shown, however, this line has 
grown considerably less clear as states have begun to take a 
more active role in mandating and promoting energy resources 
that have inevitable impacts on interstate wholesale markets.102  
 
97 Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). 
98 Id. at 89. 
99 Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 408 (2016). 
100 Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 824–824w (2012)).  “The statute’s legislative history makes clear that closing the 
‘Attleboro gap’—a regulatory void where neither the forwarding state nor the receiving 
state could regulate the pricing of electricity sold across state lines—was the legislation’s 
primary impetus.”  Rossi, supra note 99, at 409. 
101 The FPA gave: 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) . . . jurisdiction to regulate 
wholesale energy sales but preserved state authority over retail transactions.  
Courts traditionally refer to this allocation of authority between wholesale (federal) 
and retail (state) energy sales as the jurisdictional ‘bright line’ that defines spheres 
of exclusive authority based on a fixed, legalistic inquiry. 
Rossi, supra note  99, at 400. 
102 See Alexandra B. Klass, Federalism “Collisions” in Energy Policy, REG. REV. (Nov. 19, 
2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/11/19/klass-federalism-collisions-energy-
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This Section delves into the legal issues to be considered in 
designing an NCES that must co-exist with state energy policies. 
A. Marrying Federal and State Climate Policy 
1. State Preemption and Potential Federal Power Act 
Conflicts 
An NCES must either fit within the existing framework of the 
Federal Power Act (“FPA”), specifically the Regional 
Transmission Organization (“RTO”)/Independent System 
Operator (“ISO”) construct that FERC has put in place, or it 
must reform the FPA with the lightest touch so as to avoid 
upending the interstate electricity markets as they currently 
exist.  FERC issued Order 2000 in 1999 creating RTOs to 
manage interstate electricity grids.103  Among the benefits of 
RTOs, FERC highlighted efficient transmission planning, 
increased coordination among regulatory agencies, and reduced 
transaction costs. 104   As discussed in Section II(A)(2), 
comprehensive transmission planning has been inhibited by 
disparate state energy policies.  While Order 2000 relied on 
voluntary participation in RTOs, Order 1000 was issued in 2011 
with the express purpose of establishing an “affirmative 
obligation in these transmission planning regions to evaluate 
alternatives that may meet the needs of the region more 
efficiently or cost-effectively.” 105   FERC has thus been on a 
steady march towards harmonizing disparate state energy 
planning through RTOs and ISOs, but even these efforts face 
limitations as the “current regulatory structures were all 
designed for one-way power flows.”106  The design of an NCES—
 
policy/ [https://perma.cc/B8RE-Y9RP] (“As states continue to enact policies to promote 
clean energy and to block fossil fuel transport projects, federalism tensions will only 
increase.  The courts will be busy.”). 
103 Regional Transmission Organizations, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285 (Dec. 20, 1999) [hereinafter 
Order 2000]. 
104 See id. at 1999 WL 33505505, at *29. 
105 Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating 
Public Utilities, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, at P 80 (July 21, 2011) [hereinafter Order 1000]. 
106  See David Roberts, Clean Energy Technologies Threaten to Overwhelm the Grid. 
Here’s How it Can Adapt., VOX (updated Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.vox.com/energy-
and-environment/2018/11/30/17868620/renewable-energy-power-grid-architecture 
[https://perma.cc/SFZ9-HFPC] (explaining how the rise of Distributed Energy 
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with a potential influx of clean energy resources that may 
intermittently be feeding into the electricity grid—must fit 
within this increasingly anachronistic regulatory structure. 
Furthermore, the question of how a federal policy can 
productively interact with existing state clean energy standards 
will be critical in any NCES design.  The Supreme Court in 
Hughes v. Talen, recently waded into the state preemption 
debate, striking down a Maryland law that tethered support for 
an in-state power generator to the clearing price of the interstate 
wholesale capacity auction.107  The Hughes decision highlighted 
the supremacy of the Federal Power Act over interstate 
electricity markets by stating that it rejected the Maryland 
program “only because it disregards an interstate wholesale rate 
required by FERC.” 108   Conversely, the Supreme Court also 
affirmed the vast expanse of state authority over energy policy:  
“Nothing in this opinion should be read to foreclose Maryland 
and other States from encouraging production of new or clean 
generation through measures ‘untethered to a generator’s 
wholesale market participation.’”109 
As long as existing state clean energy mandates pertain to in-
state generation and do not have a discernible impact on 
interstate electricity markets, they will not be preempted by an 
NCES, unless it is explicitly written into NCES legislation.  An 
NCES in its design should also seek to minimize administrative 
redundancy with existing state clean energy mandates.110  Legal 
ambiguity can also be minimized if an NCES “contain[s] express 
provisions accommodating (rather than preempting) state-level 
 
Resources—e.g. rooftop solar panels and small-scale wind turbines—which introduce 
third-party electricity customers as potential sellers into the market stresses the current 
regulatory framework.). 
107  Under the Maryland program, the in-state power generator would bid into the 
interstate wholesale capacity market auction, but through a “contract for differences” 
mandated by the state, the generator would be paid by the utility an established contract 
price.  See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1290 (2016). 
108 Id. at 1299. 
109 Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 40, Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. 
Ct. 1288 (2016)).  
110 See Fershee, supra note 10, at 65 (“A national RPS would mean new federal reporting 
requirements for retail electricity suppliers.  For those operating in RPS states, a federal 
RPS would mean a second, potentially duplicative, reporting requirement.”). 
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RPS initiatives.”111  The overall objectives of an NCES would 
ultimately be best served when states go beyond the federal 
“floor” and undertake more ambitious clean energy targets. 
2. Harmonizing Federal and State Clean Energy Standards 
Two major components of a clean energy standard must be 
harmonized for federal and state standards to co-exist:  first, 
how clean energy credits (or their equivalent) are tracked and 
quantified; and second, what constitutes a “clean energy” 
resource.  In the absence of harmonization of these two 
components, the development of clean energy resources can be 
hindered due to uncertainties over sources of funding.112  The 
primary concern with the tracking and quantification of clean 
energy credits is the possibility of double-counting.  Ideally, a 
federal NCES would allow states to trade clean energy credits 
among themselves in order to meet their clean energy 
obligations at the least cost.  For example, double counting can 
occur when a clean energy credit representing 1MWh of a 
renewable resource for example is “used for compliance in 
one state and purchased for compliance in another.” 113 
Furthermore, what constitutes a “clean energy” resource at the 
federal level can conflict with states’ definitions, as some states 
include only renewable energy resources (e.g., solar and wind) 
and others have opted for a more expansive definition that also 
includes zero-carbon resources such as nuclear and hydropower.  
This is closely related to how clean energy credits are tracked 
and quantified—without a clear definition, states would be 
unable to effectively trade credits with each other.  This may 
necessitate a federal definition that preempts state definitions.  
In order to effectively promote clean energy and emissions 
offsets, NCES legislation would need to provide uniformity and 
certainty for states and investors.114 
 
111  James M. Van Nostrand & Anne Marie Hirschberger, Implications of A Federal 
Renewable Portfolio Standard: Will It Supplement or Supplant Existing State 
Initiatives?, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 853, 864 (2010). 
112 See id. at 866. 
113 Id. at 867. 
114 See id. at 874.  
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B. Legal Issues Arising from the Inclusion of NETs in an 
NCES 
1. Fitting NETs within a Legal Framework 
There are a number of legal considerations in facilitating the 
integration of NETs into an NCES.115  First, if a carve-out were 
to be made for NETs in an NCES, “states will need to identify 
the parties required to consider or comply with [the] NETs 
requirement.” 116   Second, most NETs are “non-generation” 
resources—that is, resources that do not generate electricity but 
are still given value in wholesale electricity markets for the 
benefits they confer.  These NETs would offset the GHG 
emissions associated with existing fossil fuel-based energy 
generation resources.  BECCS are unique among NETs because 
they can produce electricity, allowing them to directly substitute 
for other clean energy resources.  For other NETs that do not 
have the capacity to produce electricity, this accounting would 
perhaps have to occur through the quantity of GHG emissions 
captured and sequestered—or some proxy that can adequately 
measure the benefit conferred by NETs.  Another legal issue to 
be considered is what kind of entity should be allowed to obtain 
credits for building NETs and how such an entity can operate 
alongside energy producers, such as utilities and retail 
electricity suppliers, under an NCES.  For the full potential of 
NETs to be achieved, they must also offset the emissions from 
other sectors.  The housing of NETs under an NCES framework 
is primarily to leverage the established tracking and accounting 
mechanism and, in the short-term, to allow NETs to compete 
with existing clean energy technologies where NETs provide 
climate mitigation benefits at a lower cost. 
2. Drawing on the Corollaries 
Demand response and energy efficiency are two different non-
generation resource corollaries that can be drawn on to address 
 
115 For a summary of the broader legal issues surrounding NETs, see Hester, supra note 
80, at 10,413–15.  While the legal issues, such as implications for property law, are 
important factors in determining the feasibility of NETs, this Note focuses exclusively 
on the legal issues related to the integration of NETs into an NCES. 
116 Chavez, supra note 52, at 49. 
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the legal issues presented by introducing NETs into electricity 
markets.117  For example, in some states, energy efficiency is 
considered an eligible resource under the state RPS and offers 
“substantial cost savings over building or contracting for new 
renewable resources and can change the nominal renewable 
goal.” 118   Similarly, demand response also offers substantial 
benefits, especially as the presence of intermittent clean energy 
resources rises in electricity markets.119 
In Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power 
Supply Association (EPSA), the Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
FERC’s authority to regulate demand response participation in 
interstate wholesale markets. 120   At issue in EPSA was the 
statutory authority of FERC under the Federal Power Act to 
allow wholesale market operators to compensate customers for 
curtailing their electricity usage at times of peak demand.121  
FERC’s demand response rule allegedly crossed the 
jurisdictional line because of its impacts on retail electricity 
markets, which are regulated by states.  The Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of FERC, but the decision laid bare the need for 
“congressional action (and perhaps a broader Supreme Court 
decision) to update a U.S. electricity market framework that is 
over 80 years old.”122  The establishment of an NCES that allows 
for the integration of NETs offers a prime opportunity to clarify 
the regulatory uncertainties that have made federal and state 
energy policy equally difficult. 
 
117 Demand response pertains to conferring a financial benefit on large-scale electricity 
consumers to curtail their usage at peak demand times to reduce the need for ramping 
up more expensive (and often high-polluting) energy generation resources. 
118 Fischlein & Smith, supra note 64, at 285. 
119 See Niamh O’Connell et al., Benefits and Challenges of Electrical Demand Response:  
A Critical Review, 39 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 686, 688 (2014) 
(explaining how demand response can be “used to meet the fluctuations of renewable 
generation and facilitate a higher penetration than could be achieved by relying on 
conventional generation alone.  Although the energy cost of renewable resources, for 
example wind generation, is typically quite low, the associated system costs can be 
substantial.”). 
120 FERC v. EPSA, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 760 (2016). 
121 Id. at 767. 
122 See Varun Sivaram, The Supreme Court’s Decision on Demand Response Is More 
Complicated Than You Think, GREEN TECH MEDIA (Feb. 1, 2016), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-supreme-court-just-clarified-rules-
for-modern-power-regulation#gs.JlcgoFTz [https://perma.cc/4ESD-RBGV]. 
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IV. AN NCES THAT WORKS 
Part III explored the legal barriers that must be contended 
with in developing an NCES.  This Part puts forward a proposal 
for the design of an NCES that can fit within the existing federal 
legislative framework that governs the electricity sector while 
still promoting “energy federalism” by allowing states to 
continue to pursue more ambitious policies.  This Part will also 
describe how NETs can be effectively included in this 
framework. 
A. Design of an NCES 
1. Defining “Clean Energy Resources” 
In establishing an NCES, the question of what constitutes a 
“clean energy resource” must be answered and leave little room 
for legal ambiguity.  As discussed in Section II(B)(1), states have 
employed varying forms of clean energy standards that are 
predominantly focused on mandating renewable energy 
resources such as solar and wind energy.123  Of the twenty-nine 
states that have some form of a “clean energy standard,” only 
two states—California and Indiana—define clean energy 
broadly.124  California recently enacted S.B. 100—also known as 
“The 100 Percent Clean Energy Act of 2018”—mandating that 
“eligible renewable energy resources and zero-carbon resources 
supply 100 percent of all retail sales of electricity to California 
end-use customers.” 125   The specific inclusion of “zero-carbon 
resources” was notable as California had only included “eligible 
renewable energy resources” in its earlier clean energy targets 
for 2024, 2027, and 2030.126  The intent behind the broader clean 
 
123 See Fischlein & Smith, supra note 64, at 285 (“Photovoltaic, solar thermal, and wind 
power seem to be unobjectionable and can be counted in all states.”).  A small subset of 
states (Michigan, North Carolina, and Vermont) explicitly include energy efficiency in 
their clean energy standard.  See State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, supra 
note 9. 
124 See State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, supra note 9. 
125 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 454.53 (West 2019). 
126 See 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 547 (S.B. 350) (West).  The “eligible renewable energy 
resources” included solar, wind, and a smattering of other energy resources such as 
biomass, geothermal, and small hydroelectric energy.  Notably missing from the list of 
eligible resources are nuclear energy and large-scale hydroelectric energy.  See CAL. 
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energy mandate was to prioritize achieving greenhouse gas 
reductions as opposed to supporting specific energy resources.127 
Indiana’s clean energy standard goes further than California’s 
and defines “clean energy resource” to include all forms of 
hydropower, electricity generated by natural gas “which 
displaces electricity generation from an existing coal fired 
generation facility,” and methane captured from coal beds.128  
The definition also includes “[d]emand side management or 
energy efficiency initiatives.”129  This broad definition of “clean 
energy resource” recognizes any form of fuel switching or 
electricity demand reduction that reduces GHG emissions. 
An NCES can combine the best elements of California and 
Indiana’s broad definitions as to what constitutes clean energy.  
“Zero-carbon resources” should qualify under the clean energy 
standard, while noting that demand-side interventions such as 
energy efficiency can qualify as zero-carbon resources as well.  
California intentionally left the term “zero-carbon resources” 
undefined in S.B. 100 to allow for technologies that would not 
qualify under traditional definitions of renewable energy. 130  
Recent congressional proposals for an NCES have included an 
emissions intensity benchmark,131  providing partial credit for 
 
ENERGY COMM’N, RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD ELIGIBILITY (June 2015), 
https://www.energy.ca.gov/2015publications/CEC-300-2015-001/CEC-300-2015-001-
ED8-CMF.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q24-6JBD]. 
127 See David Krause, SB 100 Zero-Carbon Definition Still Up in the Air; Large Hydro 
Undecided, NEWSDATA (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.newsdata.com/california_energy_ 
markets/regulation_status/sb-zero-carbon-definition-still-up-in-the-air-
large/article_2a0f3e54-e6d5-11e9-81fa-03d5ff0c7f4d.html [https://perma.cc/NP7E-5R8L] 
(“The zero-carbon portion of SB 100 is intended to be more inclusive than the RPS portion 
in terms of the types or resources that are eligible . . . If an energy generation resource 
does not produce greenhouse gas emissions, it would be eligible to meet the 100 percent 
renewable and zero-carbon target.”). 
128 IND. CODE § 8-1-37-4 (2011). 
129 IND. CODE § 8-1-37-4(a)(16) (2011). 
130 See Debra Kahn, Bill to Establish ‘Carbon-Free’ Grid Advances, CLIMATE WIRE (July 
5, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060087891 (“The term ‘zero-carbon’ is 
undefined; lawmakers intend it to encompass more than the dozen types of renewable 
resources that are currently eligible for the RPS.”  The article further quotes the author 
of the bill, state Senator Kevin de León, as stating the bill seeks to provide “flexibilities 
for technologies that are on the horizon” and citing carbon capture and sequestration 
and nuclear power as potential options.). 
131 See DISCUSSION DRAFT, CLIMATE LEADERSHIP AND ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR OUR 
NATION’S (CLEAN) FUTURE ACT, 116th Cong. (2020), https://energycommerce.house. 
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fossil fuel generators to distinguish the differing climate 
impacts, for example, between a coal power plant and a natural 
gas power plant. 132   Any definition of “clean energy,” or 
benchmark, that an NCES adopts should be viewed as a 
minimum standard.  States should be given the flexibility to 
determine whether they meet the standard through exclusive 
use of renewable energy resources or through a mix of renewable 
energy resources, demand-side measures, non-renewable but 
zero-carbon resources such as nuclear energy, or perhaps even 
less carbon-intensive energy resources.  As discussed in Section 
IV(B), NETs can also qualify under this broad definition of clean 
energy. 
2. State-Level Clean Energy Mandates 
Perhaps the most vexing question of an NCES is how targets 
will be set among states and at what pace these targets will 
ratchet up until deep decarbonization of the electricity sector in 
each state is achieved.133  The Obama Administration’s Clean 
Power Plan offers guidance.  Under the authority of Section 111 
 
gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/0128%20CLEAN%20F
uture%20Discussion%20Draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CMD-45MG] [hereinafter CLEAN 
Future Act]; CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD ACT OF 2019, 116th Cong. (2019), 
https://smithsenate.app.box.com/s/pnq9j3rmxdxlk7nigu58710b8xrlcmk5 
[https://perma.cc/NTN5-6PWJ] [hereinafter CESA 2019]. 
132  The CLEAN Future Act sets an emissions intensity benchmark of 0.82 metric 
tons/MWh which would result “in more natural gas use and less coal use” compared to 
CESA 2019, which sets “a benchmark [0.4 metric tons/MWh] that is low enough to 
preclude natural gas (without carbon capture) from earning credit.”  PAUL PICCIANO ET 
AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, TWO KEY DESIGN PARAMETERS IN CLEAN ELECTRICITY 
STANDARDS 1–2 (Feb. 2020), https://media.rff.org/documents/IB_20-03.pdf.  
[https://perma.cc/6BKV-ZL56]. 
133 Scholars have alternatively proposed the point of regulation for an NCES to be at the 
level of electric utilities or power plants. See CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS 
(C2ES), AN ILLUSTRATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR A CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD FOR THE POWER 
SECTOR 2 (Nov. 2011), https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2011/ 
11/CES-framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/73K2-AJQ9] (“CES is an electricity portfolio 
standard with a point of regulation at (compliance obligation on) electric utilities.”); Aldy, 
supra note 8, at 10,136 (“The point of regulation for the NCES would be at the power 
plant.”).  As argued in Section III(A)(1), the Federal Power Act conflicts can be minimized 
if the point of regulation of an NCES is at the state level.  Moreover, the strength of an 
NCES would come from providing states with broad authority to design their own clean 
energy portfolios.  See FITZPATRICK ET AL., supra note 65 (“A smartly designed Clean 
Energy Standard would provide states with maximum flexibility in their paths toward 
decarbonization.”). 
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of the Clean Air Act, the Obama Administration sought to 
regulate GHG emissions from power plants.134  To that end, the 
Administration established a framework of cooperative 
federalism in which each state would develop and submit 
standards of performance for new and existing sources.135  The 
Administrator would also have the authority “to prescribe a plan 
for a State in cases where the State fails to submit a satisfactory 
plan.”136  Foundational to the Clean Power Plan is the idea that 
“each state has differing policy considerations—including 
varying regional emission reduction opportunities and existing 
state programs and measures—and that the characteristics of 
the electricity system in each state (e.g., utility regulatory 
structure and generation mix) also differ.”137   An NCES can 
emulate the cooperative federalism model employed by the 
Clean Power Plan, establishing a federal standard that states 
must meet by either developing their own plan or allowing the 
federal government to develop a plan for the state.  The federally 
established standard for each state would serve as a floor upon 
which states can build if they choose. 
Although the Clean Power Plan relied on the EPA’s statutory 
authority to regulate emissions from stationary sources (power 
plants), it provided flexibility to states to meet the emissions 
intensity targets for power plants through an emission budget 
approach.  Through what are commonly known as “outside the 
fence line” measures, states could meet their emission budgets 
outside the confines of just regulating individual power plants, 
and also through energy efficiency measures or investment in 
other low-carbon energy sources, for example.  While the 
“outside the fence line” provision of the Clean Power Plan caused 
 
134 See Gabriel Pacyniak, Making the Most of Cooperative Federalism: What the Clean 
Power Plan Has Already Achieved, 29 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 301, 308 (2017) (Section 111 
of the CAA . . . is generally concerned with the establishment of performance standards 
for categories of new stationary sources of air pollution . . . . However, Section 111(d)] 
charges the EPA with regulating pollutants from categories of existing sources under 
certain circumstances.”). 
135 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(c)–(d) (2018). 
136 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(2)(A) (2018). 
137 Carbon Pollution Emissions Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:  Electricity 
Utility Generation Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,666 (Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Clean 
Power Plan]. 
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it much legal consternation,138 an NCES that is passed through 
legislation would avoid such legal challenges by exclusively 
giving states an emission budget mandate that can be achieved 
through a broad range of compliance measures. 
Each state’s obligation under the NCES can be determined by 
developing a state-specific clean energy target based on the 
state’s current fossil fuel generation mix. 139   The aggregate 
national clean energy target can be pegged to the Deep 
Decarbonization Pathways Project’s scenarios for 
decarbonization of the U.S. electricity sector.140  The state clean 
energy mandate should be established in the form of a 
percentage of retail electricity sales that must come from clean 
energy resources (or commensurate NETs to offset emissions 
from non-clean energy resources).  Every five years, the mandate 
can be updated, synchronizing with the five-year cycles of the 
Paris Agreement. 141   By establishing the mandate as a 
percentage of total retail electricity sales, states have the 
opportunity to harmonize their existing clean energy mandates 
using the federal mandate as a floor.  Additionally, by regulating 
states at the level of overall retail electricity sales, as opposed to 
regulating individual retail suppliers, the proposed NCES would 
avoid encroaching on state authority over the regulation of retail 
electricity as described in Section III(A)(1).  Wholesale electricity 
markets, which fall under FERC jurisdiction, would be able to 
 
138 See LINDA TSANG & ALEXANDRA M. WYATT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4480, CLEAN 
POWER PLAN:  LEGAL BACKGROUND AND PENDING LITIGATION IN WEST VIRGINIA V. EPA 
19–20 (Mar. 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44480.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK5F-
W4GP] (summarizing “outside the fence line” legal challenges to the Clean Power Plan). 
139 While the exact formula of a state-specific clean energy target is beyond the scope of 
this Note, EPA’s calculation of state-specific emissions rates for the Clean Power Plan 
can provide guidance.  For a summary of EPA’s state-specific emission rate formula, see 
JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44145, EPA’S 
CLEAN POWER PLAN: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE FINAL RULE 4–8 (Sep. 2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44145.pdf [https://perma.cc/D83J-N6UT]. 
140 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 72. 
141 The Paris Agreement requires each Party to “communicate a nationally determined 
contribution every five years . . . informed by the outcomes of the global stocktake” which 
also occurs on a recurring five-year basis.  Paris Agreement to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4, ¶ 9, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-
1104 [hereafter Paris Agreement].  Despite the Trump Administration’s withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement, a future administration that seeks to rejoin the Paris 
Agreement may want to use the NCES as a tool to deliver on its pledges towards the 
agreement. 
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adapt to any upward pressure placed by the NCES mandate on 
retail electricity sales.142  In form, the NCES mandate would not 
operate differently from an RPS mandated by a state legislature.  
Based on the mandate, state regulators can accordingly dictate 
how retail electricity suppliers and individual power generators 
reorient themselves to meet the state’s NCES obligation. 
3. A National Clean Energy Credit Trading System Among 
States 
One of the greatest strengths of an NCES regulated at the 
state level is the ability for states to reduce compliance costs by 
trading clean energy credits.  After all, states are not equally 
endowed in their access to clean energy resources.143  It has been 
argued that a national RPS mandate—an NCES—“would result 
in a significant transfer of wealth from states with scarce 
renewable energy resources to those with an abundance of 
renewables.”144  In the proposed NCES, the broader definition of 
“clean energy” and the inclusion of NETs for NCES compliance 
provide an opportunity for clean energy-scarce states to avoid 
being at a financial disadvantage.  These states can invest in 
NETs to meet their clean energy mandates and sell credits to 
clean energy-rich states that may see cost curves significantly 
rise after reaching higher levels of renewable penetration in the 
electricity grid.145 
 
142 FERC Perspectives:  Questions Concerning EPA's Clean Power Plan and Other Grid 
Reliability Challenges:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the H. 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. 45 (2014) (statement of Cheryl LaFleur, 
Acting Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) (answering the question of 
Rep. Joe Barton (R-Tex.), Acting Chairman of FERC Cheryl LaFleur responded, “the 
EPA makes environmental rules and those become the baseline within which the system 
is planned, and we have to make certain that within those rules the rates are done in a 
just and reasonable way and that we will be paying attention to that as well as paying 
attention to reliability.”). 
143 See Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1649 (2015) 
(“Based on regional climate conditions, topography, and other land characteristics, the 
endowment with renewable energy resources varies significantly between states and 
across different strands of renewable energy technologies.”). 
144 Id. at 1650. 
145 See Jorge Blazquez et al., The Renewable Energy Policy Paradox, 82 RENEWABLE AND 
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 1 (2018) (arguing that the value of renewable energy on the 
grid can significantly drop at high penetration levels). 
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The federal government can establish a Clean Energy Credit 
(“CEC”) system to facilitate trading among states.  The CEC 
system should be “unbundled,” meaning the purchaser and 
seller of CECs do not have to be connected in the same grid.146  
Such a system would not only reduce compliance costs, 147  it 
would also “support robust, accurate, and efficient tracking and 
accounting” of clean energy generation and NETs. 148  
Independent power generators or NET operators can directly 
apply for certification from a federal CEC system.  Depending on 
how a state decides to pursue its compliance measures, either a 
state itself can directly purchase CECs from the federal entity, 
or state-regulated retail electricity suppliers can purchase 
CECs. 
A federal CEC system must avoid double counting CECs and 
harmonize with existing state systems.149  Double counting can 
occur where both a state and the national system provide a 
project with credits.  While participation in the federal CEC 
system would be voluntary for states, some states—especially 
those with existing trading systems—may be compelled to 
participate to avoid the double counting issue and also 
harmonize their systems with other states.150  The backbone of 
 
146 See The Bottom Line on Renewable Energy Certificates, 11 WORLD RESOURCES INST. 
2 (Nov. 2008), https://wriorg.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/pdf/bottom_line_renewable_ 
energy_certs.pdf?_ga=2.137170928.1142123797.1549996242-1126424856.1549573550 
[https://perma.cc/F3RF-Z3GK]. 
147 See WARREN LEON, CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALL., DESIGNING THE RIGHT RPS: A GUIDE 
TO SELECTING GOALS AND PROGRAM OPTIONS FOR A RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD 
30 (Mar. 2012), https://www.cesa.org/assets/2012-Files/RPS/CESA-RPS-Goals-and-
Program-Design-Report-March-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WR4-4AJZ] (“In general, 
RECs provide verification of compliance with an RPS, reducing the risk of double 
counting and fraud.”). 
148 SADIE COX & SEAN ESTERLY, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., NREL/TP-6A20-65507, 
RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY STANDARDS:  GOOD PRACTICES AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
4 (Jan. 2016), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16osti/65507.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/27VY-YC2E]. 
149 “Twenty-four (24) U.S. states and territories explicitly recognize [Renewable Energy 
Credits] as representing ‘attributes’ of generation (or similar); twenty-four (24) recognize 
them as mechanisms for ‘tracking’ or ‘trading’ (or equivalent) electricity or attributes.”  
TODD JONES ET AL., CTR. FOR RESOURCE SOLUTIONS, THE LEGAL BASIS FOR RENEWABLE 
ENERGY CERTIFICATES 3 (June 2015), https://resource-solutions.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/The-Legal-Basis-for-RECs.pdf [https://perma.cc/8T77-UVLU]. 
150 See TODD JONES, CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALL., TWO MARKETS, OVERLAPPING GOALS: 
EXPLORING THE INTERSECTION OF RPS AND VOLUNTARY MARKETS FOR RENEWABLE 
ENERGY IN THE U.S. 15 (2017), https://resource-solutions.org/wp-
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a federal CEC system is a robust tracking and verification 
apparatus.  PJM—a regional grid operator that serves up to 14 
states151—operates a Generation Attributes Tracking System 
(“GATS”) that can be emulated. 152  Under GATS, credits “are 
created for every one megawatt-hour, or every 1,000 kilowatt-
hours (kWh), of electric generation.  Every specific megawatt-
hour of electric generation is individually certified with a unique 
serial number.”153  While this would in fact impose additional 
administrative burdens, these burdens are minimized by the 
fact that the technological know-how to track CECs already 
exists due to established state and regional trading systems.154  
CECs under this system will be credited on a per megawatt-hour 
basis and traded as such. 
B. How NETs can be included in an NCES 
1. Defining “NETs” 
As described in Part II(B)(2), NETs can encompass a broad 
range of technologies.  In order for an NCES to achieve its stated 
objective of reducing GHG emissions, if NETs are to be included 
in this scheme, the definition as to what constitutes “NETs” 
must be clearly defined.155  This definition must also leave room 
for new technologies that have not yet been proven to be 
 
content/uploads/2017/08/RPS-and-Voluntary-Markets.pdf [https://perma.cc/AMQ4-
MLBW] (“[S]tandardization and consistency between markets and states with respect to 
what a tradable REC is and attributes are included has benefits with respect to overall 
liquidity and participation.”).  A streamlined voluntary federal CEC system can also 
provide spillover benefits in the form of private participation in clean energy investment.  
See id. at 12 (“The existence of a national voluntary market can make it financially 
feasible for businesses and institutions to finance renewable energy projects that help a 
state meet its RPS compliance goals while allowing the financing organization to claim 
use of renewable energy.”). 
151  See Who We Are, PJM, https://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/VUT8-4UQU] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
152  See, About GATS, PJM, https://www.pjm-eis.com/getting-started/about-GATS.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/MEL3-WSTW] (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
153 Id. 
154  See Fershee, supra note 10, at 70 (“Given that the predominant technology for 
tracking RECs is already working across regions with significant differences, a national 
solution should be feasible, if not simple.”). 
155  See Jan C. Minx et al., Negative Emissions—Part 1:  Research Landscape and 
Synthesis, 13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 3 (May 2018) (providing a survey of the broad range 
of definitions for “negative emissions”). 
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viable.156  Additionally, this definition of NETs should account 
for the potential that “even if negative emission options prove 
feasible, and can be undertaken at large scale without adverse 
ecological and social consequences, they could still prove less 
effective than expected at reducing climate impacts.” 157   In 
particular, the sequestration of carbon can be reversed through 
human action and natural forces. 158   Using the IPCC 159  and 
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s160 
definitions as a basis, NETs should be defined as any technology 
that naturally or artificially enhances the sinks of greenhouse gas 
emissions on a time scale that positively impacts climate 
change.161  This definition is inclusive of both currently viable 
and potentially viable NETs.  Most importantly, it also 
establishes a requirement that the GHG reduction benefit 
provided by any technology must be discernible and irreversible 
on a time scale that ensures an overall climate benefit.  The 
definition of what constitutes a “time scale that positively 
impacts climate change” will have to be further refined by a 
regulatory agency—perhaps the EPA—through a rulemaking 
after comprehensive study. 
 
156 See Sabine Fuss et al., Negative Emissions—Part 2:  Costs, Potentials and Side Effects, 
13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 34 (May 2018) (summarizing the “nascent stage” of some NETs 
and “emerging ideas for removing greenhouse gases”). 
157 SIVAN KARTHA & KATE DOOLEY, STOCKHOLM ENV’T. INST., THE RISKS OF RELYING ON 
TOMORROW’S ‘NEGATIVE EMISSIONS’ TO GUIDE TODAY’S MITIGATION ACTION 5 (Aug. 
2016). 
158 See id. (“vulnerable to release either through human action (e.g. land clearing) or 
natural forces outside of human control (drought, fire, pests, and other factors”). 
159 The IPCC’s definition of “mitigation” is “a human intervention to reduce the sources 
or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gas emissions.”  IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:  
MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, WOKRING GROUP III CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC 37 (Ottmar Edenhoffer et al. eds., 2014) (emphasis 
added). 
160 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine posits that for “direct air 
capture systems to be considered a negative emissions technology, they should sequester 
the captured CO2 on a time scale that positively impacts climate change.”  NAT’L ACAD. 
OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 74, at 189 (emphasis added). 
161 The IPCC’s definition of “mitigation” applied to NETs would subsume NETs that rely 
on natural processes such as “afforestation and reforestation (AR), soil carbon 
sequestration (SCS), ocean fertilization (OF), biochar (BC) or enhanced weathering 
(EW)” but would exclude “NETs that geologically store the sequestered CO2 such as 
BECCS or direct air capture with carbon capture and storage (DACCS).”  Minx et al., 
supra note 155, at 3.  The proposed definition of NETs would be all-inclusive of both 
natural and artificial technologies that sequester carbon. 
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2. Integrating NETs into a National Trading Mechanism 
The most significant challenge in integrating NETs into a 
federal CEC system is tracking and accounting for the removed 
GHG emissions.162  There must be a system “to measure the 
carbon captured, the amount successfully sequestered, the 
permanence of sequestration, and provide comparable 
measurements across different environments and 
technologies.” 163   Proposals for the integration of NETs into 
trading mechanisms have all pertained to mechanisms that 
quantify credits based on eschewed GHG emissions. 164  
However, the proposed CEC system operates on a per megawatt-
hour basis.  NETs can be integrated into this system through a 
conversion factor that varies based on state.  Depending on the 
state that a specific NET is located, the NET will be credited 
based on the average GHG emissions intensity of the electricity 
system in that state.165 
This would have two practical effects:  first, it would encourage 
states that have a high penetration of clean energy in their 
electricity grid to continue investing in clean energy, as NETs in 
these states would not provide significant value on the national 
CEC trading system; second, for states that have high GHG 
emissions intensity (primarily fossil fuel-rich states), it 
incentivizes them to deploy NETs as an alternative means to 
fulfill their clean energy obligations.  Another effect of a dynamic 
system of accounting for NETs is that it would provide early 
incentives for GHG-intensive states to invest in NETs without 
disincentivizing compliance with the state’s clean energy 
 
162 See Guy Lomax et al., Investing in Negative Emissions, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 
498, 499 (June 2015) (“The task of accounting for the removed greenhouse gases poses a 
considerable challenge to practical policy integration . . . .  Especially with approaches 
based on ecosystems, soils and biomass, the greenhouse-gas storage varies with time and 
external factors, making it difficult to accurately measure the amount of carbon stored.”). 
163 See Chavez, supra note 52, at 49. 
164  See Paul Zakkour et al., Incentivising and Accounting for Negative Emission 
Technologies, 63 ENERGY PROCEDIA 6824 (2014) (summarizing existing GHG emissions 
trading systems and their accounting frameworks that can be applied to NETs). 
165  The average GHG emissions intensity for the electricity sector in each state is 
available at State Carbon Dioxide Emissions Data, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (last 
updated Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/ [https://perm 
a.cc/K7ZD-TMAH]. 
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obligation through the use of traditional clean energy 
technologies.166 
V. CONCLUSION 
As legal battles continue to saddle states that desire to pursue 
their own clean energy policies, 167  this Note puts forward a 
pragmatic proposal for an NCES that clearly delineates between 
federal and state authority over the electricity sector, 
minimizing legal uncertainty.  Under the proposal, while the 
federal government would establish clean energy mandates for 
each state, states would then have the autonomy to comply with 
the mandates in the manner they deem fit.  States may choose a 
straightforward path to compliance drawing on prior RPS 
experience to mandate clean energy investment.  States may 
also pursue a mixed approach of mandating clean energy 
investment while also participating in a national Clean Energy 
Credit trading system, which would benefit states that are rich 
in clean energy as well as those that must transition from a 
carbon-intensive electricity sector.  Critically, states are also 
given the option of pursuing compliance and selling CECs 
through the use of Negative Emissions Technologies.  State 
obligations are tailored to the circumstances of each state with 
the intent to avoid disproportionately burdening carbon-
intensive states.  Flexibility is ultimately the defining feature of 
the proposed NCES. 
This Note’s contribution to the literature is the incorporation 
of NETs in the proposal for an NCES.  As recent climate reports 
have highlighted, any hope of preventing catastrophic global 
warming requires some form of NETs.168  Recognizing the need 
for NETs, particularly in making them more commercially 
viable, the proposed NCES provides an avenue through which 
NETs can, at an early stage, be incentivized.  States with carbon-
 
166 These early incentives to develop NETs will be critical as they “need to be developed 
soon because uncertainty remains over the ability of many of these technologies to be 
utilized at the scale necessary.  None of the NETs currently operate at scale, and, in fact, 
none of them have been developed as a commercial product.”  Chavez, supra note 52, at 
20. 
167 See supra Sections II(A)(2) and III(A)(1). 
168 See supra Section II(B)(2). 
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intensive electricity sectors will have a strong interest in 
investing in NETs to avoid having to make major infrastructural 
changes in the short term.  This would benefit the NETs 
industry at large and could provide the critical function of 
making these technologies commercially viable when the United 
States and other countries must begin to reach net-negative 
GHG emissions in the second half of this century.  The proposed 
method of integration of NETs into the CEC trading system is 
novel in its use of a dynamic method to incentivize investment 
in NETs during the early years of an NCES and slowly phasing 
out the incentive allowing for a dedicated federal system for 
NETs to be established later. Future scholarship can shed 
further light on the legal mechanisms to track and regulate 
NETs as they become a more prominent pillar of decarbonization 
policy. 
